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1. Introduction: 
 
This paper consists of two parts, which are conceptually only 
loosely interconnected. Proceeding from an impressionistic 
comparison of Bhutanese development in the late 1950s and 
in the late 1990s, Part I of this essay explores the missing 
link, the question of why development has taken the shape it 
did and why certain policy priorities were adopted, while 
others were neglected. It is concerned with the vision of 
Bhutanese development and its determining factors rather 
than with the technicalities of the actual development process. 
It will be argued that the Bhutanese development concept 
evolved from the country’s unique socio-economic, historic 
and political circumstances, thus being one of the last truly 
indigenous development approaches. As such, the first part of 
the paper suggests a model of Gross National Happiness, 
which is based on empirical research.1 It is important to 
emphasise this, considering that the current discourse on 
Gross National Happiness seems dominated by various 
opinions and ad hoc interpretations, which assume a certain 
meaning of the concept as the starting point for assessment or 
commentary.  
 
Concluding that Gross National Happiness – a vision sui 
generis – has led to an astonishingly smooth and undistorted 
process of change, Part II of the paper (6. The Crossroads) 
outlines three imminent challenges, which can be expected to 
put increasing pressure on the concept and call for an early 
adjustment of development priorities. As such, the second 
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part of the essay is intended to be a policy-oriented concept 
paper rather than a research paper.  
 
PART I 
 
2. Forty Years of History – A World Apart 
 
For the visitor to Bhutan at the end of the 1990s it is hard to 
imagine how different a place Bhutan was as recently as four 
decades ago. In fact, forty years back “except for a minute 
proportion of the elite, the social structure, value system and 
life style of the Bhutanese did not differ very much from that 
of their ancestors around 1500”.2 The vast majority of the 
population spent their lives as subsistence farmers, almost 
totally dependent on the yield of some acres of agricultural 
land and the adjoining forests. Where a small surplus was 
achieved it was bartered, since money was virtually 
unknown.3 Due to the entire absence of motorable roads, all 
goods had to be transported on mule tracks. The health 
infrastructure of the whole country consisted of four hospitals 
staffed with two trained doctors, a handful of dispensaries 
and a leper colony. Epidemics, which sometimes wiped out 
whole villages, reduced the life expectancy to an estimated 
average of 38 years in 1960. Under these circumstances 
education was considered a luxury unnecessary for survival. 
Thus, the end of the 1950s saw only 440 children enrolled in 
the country’s formal education system, consisting of 11 
primary schools.  
 
It is difficult to deny that the Kingdom's contemporary 
developmental situation is unrecognisably different. While 
85% of the population still live in rural areas, modernisation 
has reached the most remote corners of the country. An 
extensive network of agricultural and livestock extension 
centres, catering to many inaccessible areas of Bhutan, has 
resulted in substantively increased yields, more diversified 
farming and improved cattle breeding. 3000 km of roads, 
hundreds of suspension bridges, and in some parts electricity 
and modern telecommunication facilities have brought the 
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districts of Bhutan closer together. Increased income 
generation activities have raised the per capita income to 
$510, exceeding the income of its South Asian neighbours. 
However, Bhutan's most impressive development achievement 
is its social infrastructure, with both health and educational 
services generally free of cost to the population. Apart from 26 
hospitals and 145 Basic Health Units a network of some 450 
outreach clinics4 cater to otherwise inaccessible areas, 
resulting in a basic health coverage of 90% of the population 
and in a dramatic increase of average life expectancy, which 
presently stands at 66 years. Similarly, the education system 
is booming. In 1998, more than 100,000 students enrolled in 
some 300 schools benefit from formal education. The gross 
primary enrolment rate has reached 72%, and the literacy rate 
grew from 17% to 47.5% in the last two decades. 
 
Other areas of development, which are considered essential 
features of conventional development approaches, such as 
public sector reform and private sector development, have 
received less attention in Bhutan. As maybe the most popular 
example, tourism has been restricted in order to minimise 
social and environmental damage.  
 
3. The Bhutanese Development Approach 
 
Obviously, a variety of factors determine the success or failure 
of development processes, and it would be simplistic to 
overemphasise any one aspect. It is widely recognised that 
Bhutan has fared well in terms of development. However, 
development circumstances were simply too different to rate 
Bhutan’s development performance in comparison with 
neighbouring countries. While Bhutan embarked later on 
modern development than its neighbours, thereby starting 
prima facie from a lower literacy rate, life expectancy and per 
capita income, its undertaking to develop was more 
manageable due to a much lower population density. While 
Bhutan’s rugged terrain complicated the build-up of physical 
infrastructure, the significantly higher per capita aid flows 
more than compensated for this disadvantage.  
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However that may be none of these external factors explains 
why Bhutanese development was taking place the way and the 
speed it actually happened.  The following paragraphs propose 
that a major reason for Bhutan’s smooth and successful 
development was that Bhutan possessed a powerful vision, 
which evolved from the country’s unique historical, 
geopolitical and sociological circumstances and determined 
the broad framework, how to proceed.  
 
Development with an emphasis on the economic sphere is a 
relatively recent idea in Bhutan, resulting from the most 
fundamental shift of paradigm in Bhutanese history, the 
abandonment of isolationism in 1959.5  It is a little surprising 
that an elaborated statement of the country’s development 
objectives did not accompany the beginning of the new era. In 
fact, a comprehensive formulation of the national development 
vision has only recently been included in an official 
government document. The aims and objectives of 
development have been outlined as follows: "Apart from the 
obvious objectives of development: to increase GDP on a 
national level and incomes at the household level, 
development in Bhutan includes the achievement of less 
quantifiable objectives. These include ensuring the emotional 
well-being of the population, the preservation of Bhutan’s 
cultural heritage and its rich and varied natural resources."6 
This declaration builds upon a catchphrase, “Gross National 
Happiness”, which was introduced by the king in the late 
1980s and has rapidly evolved into the accepted label for the 
distinct Bhutanese development concept. In spite of its 
seemingly recent origin, the term is really a popularisation of 
the distinct Bhutanese perception of the fundamental purpose 
of development, which can be traced throughout the period of 
development.7    
 
The simple reason is that the approach is not an intellectual 
construct detached from practical experience, but rather the 
translation of a cultural and social consciousness into 
development priorities. Thus the concept of Gross National 
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Happiness has organically evolved from the constituent 
features of Bhutanese society before 1959, a socio-economic 
system based on a Buddhist and feudal set of values. This 
naturally does not contradict the fact that the substance of 
Gross National Happiness might have changed over time or 
might have been supplemented by outside concepts. 
 
4. Happiness as an Objective 
 
Due to the scarcity of written sources, indications of a 
development philosophy with the objective of happiness are 
difficult to detect in the first two decades of Bhutanese 
development. On the one hand, the National Assembly, the 
legislative organ, seems to have been more concerned about 
specific interventions and local subjects than about 
conceptual issues or broad guidelines.8 On the other hand, 
the Planning Commission, as the main body responsible for 
the implementation of development projects, had not yet 
incorporated well-being as an explicit goal. Early evidence on 
the Bhutanese perception of the purpose of development is 
furnished by the highest policy-making level, the king. In his 
major statements (and in those of senior officials)9 and 
decrees the notion of “happiness” was a recurrent term 
whenever the objective of development was outlined.  
 
Already in the late 1960s, a period during which Bhutan’s 
development policy is generally considered to have followed 
conventional patterns of rapid modernisation10, Late King 
Jigme Dorji Wangchuck expressed his view on the goal of 
development as making “the people prosperous and happy.”11 
Similarly, the prominence of “prosperity and happiness” is 
highlighted in the king’s address on the occasion of Bhutan’s 
admission to the UN in 1971, one of the most important 
events in the country’s recent history. This vision, first 
articulated by the late king was elaborated by the present 
king, Jigme Singye Wangchuck, who declared in the first years 
of his reign that “our country’s policy is to consolidate our 
sovereignty to achieve economic self-reliance, prosperity and 
happiness for our country and people.” While the emphasis is 
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placed on both, prosperity and happiness, the latter is 
considered of more significance. For Bhutan “Gross National 
Happiness is more important than Gross National Product”.  
 
5. The Determinants of Gross National Happiness 
 
Concluding that the yardstick of Bhutanese development has 
always been emotional well-being rather than mere economic 
progress, this section explores the influencing and 
determining factors of the concept. Their configuration and 
the interrelations of the dimensions of Bhutanese 
development are schematically demonstrated in the figure 
below.  
  
Conceptual building blocks are arranged in three levels 
according to their position in a cause-and-effect hierarchy. 
The uppermost level, here called the level of superstructure, 
contains the ‘input’ components (the influencing and 
determining factors) for the Bhutanese development concept. 
While the conceptual elements (people-centred or human 
development, self-reliance, cultural preservation and 
environmental preservation) of Gross National Happiness are 
a reflection of these determinants, they constituted at the 
same time the set of inputs for the operational level of 
Bhutanese development i. e. the level of policies and projects. 
Since this paper is primarily concerned with the vision of 
Bhutanese development the issues to be explored are  
- which were the conceptual inputs of Gross National 
Happiness and  
- how are they reflected in the vision. 
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Conceptual Levels of Bhutanese Development 
 
5.1 Geopolitical Realities/National Security Concerns 
 
Development, particularly in the first years, was a function 
of national security concerns triggered by a fundamental 
shift in the regional balance of power. 12 The decision to 
open the country toward the south and to embark on 
economic development was thus not based on a change of 
ideological conviction. The physical result of the paradigm 
shift was the first road-link to India, which changed 
Bhutan’s fate irreversibly and had crucial implications on its 
path to development. Topographical barriers were the 
primary reason for the country’s centuries-long isolation in 
terms of knowledge, information and values. Their removal 
gave way to interdependence and outside influence.  
 
However, this was not always considered beneficial but 
rather seen as a danger to the functioning parts of the social 
structure. The fact that modernisation was triggered by 
external factors rather than by a shift in Bhutanese political 
conviction explains the inherent conservativeness of Gross 
National Happiness. It often resulted in the renunciation of 
decisions in favour of more rapid economic or social change. 
More recently, it led to counter measures and the adoption 
of cultural preservation as a positive policy concept. 
 
The course of historical events substantiates that Bhutan’s 
decision to embark on modern development was not 
voluntary. Despite several reforms which had taken place in 
the 1950s, “Bhutan was the last physically isolated state in 
the modern world, the only political entity that was almost 
totally ignored by the world”13 when the Indian Prime 
Minister Nehru visited Bhutan in September 1958.14 During 
his visit Nehru expressed his concerns about Bhutan’s 
security and emphasised the need of a road link between 
Bhutan and India,15 offering at the same time financial and 
technical assistance. Shortly after Nehru’s visit the issue 
was discussed in the National Assembly, and although the 
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construction of a road was endorsed in principle, it was not 
deemed of the utmost urgency. Hence it was decided to 
forego the most evident source of assistance – India - in 
order to avoid increased dependence. Instead, it was 
resolved to seek financial assistance from third countries, a 
cumbersome task without formal diplomatic relations.  
 
Bhutan’s attitude changed during the year 1959 as a clear 
consequence of events in Tibet. In the spring of 1959 the 
Tibetan revolt was suppressed by the Chinese, which 
resulted in the flow of several thousand Tibetan refugees 
into Bhutan. By autumn of the same year Chinese actions 
began to be directed against Bhutan. Revolutionary 
propaganda material was sent into the country and the 
Chumbi valley, a triangular-shaped part of Tibetan territory 
between Sikkim and Bhutan,16 through which the most 
important trade route from Bhutan to India was running, 
was sealed off. In the following National Assembly session, 
the construction of roads became the main issue of 
discussion. Due to the entire absence of diplomatic relations 
with third countries, India was considered the only possible 
source of aid.17 The dice were cast. Bhutan had decided to 
change its fate irreversibly. 
 
Undeniably the events of 1959 critically compromised the 
King’s original intention to transform the country gradually 
and keep outside influence at a minimal level.18 However, the 
set of attitudes and fears that had sustained the isolationist 
orientation for centuries did not die out over night. This is 
illustrated by the fact that the first Five Year Plan 
concentrated development activities not in the capital, but in 
the adjoining valley of Paro «to keep the influx of outsiders at 
some distance from the heart of the country.»19 Thus the 
abrupt end of political seclusion and the high degree of 
Indian penetration in the first years of modernisation were 
perceived as the inevitable price of maintaining 
independence. Bhutan, no different from any other rationally 
acting state, addressed the security dimension with higher 
immediacy than the development dimension.20  
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As soon as the fear of possible Chinese aggression declined, 
the shaping of development regained priority. Measures of 
cultural preservation were soon adopted to contain and 
counter-balance the negative effects of modernisation. The 
paradox in the Bhutanese case is that not the measures to 
restore the status quo ante were the new concept of domestic 
politics, but economic development was. After all the 
preservation of the social and cultural framework had been 
the defining factor of the country’s internal affairs until 
1959.  
 
5.2 The Impact of Nation-building and Independence 
 
Through a combination of geopolitical circumstances and 
deliberate isolationist policies the political framework of 
Bhutan provided the organisational foundation for an ever 
self-assuring value base, which resulted in an exceptionally 
strong consciousness of political, social and cultural identity. 
Three historical factors appear to have been of crucial 
importance for this development. 
 
Bhutan’s national identity is rooted in the first half of the 
17th century when Ngawang Namgyal (Shabdrung), a leading 
abbot of the Tibetan Drukpa sect, eliminated all his rivals 
and unified the country. Henceforth Bhutan was governed 
from a network of Dzongs, impregnable fortresses, which not 
only prevented further Tibetan incursions into the 
Bhutanese heartland, but also served as religious political 
centres in each district. Bhutan’s political identity is thus 
closely intertwined with its religious history.21 Indeed, the 
state’s primary function was to support the religious 
establishment, which in turn promoted humanistic morality 
and ethics among the lay population.22 Thus the dominance 
of the Drukpa religious and cultural patterns, which stems 
from this fundamentally important period in Bhutan’s 
history, has been perpetuated through national policy. By 
the same token Buddhism served as a integrating factor 
when the assertion of centralised power gave way to 
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increased political fragmentation in the latter half of the 19th 
century. As such, two dimensions of nation building, namely 
the identity of the territory (the state, which survived 
primarily due to its topographical barriers) and the identity of 
the subjects in this space (the nation, which was defined by 
Buddhism) were reasonably well established by 1900. It was 
the merit of the monarchical system to strengthen the third 
dimension, the link between leadership and the subjects 
through government and administration.  
 
The establishment of the monarchy in 1907 did not trigger 
fundamental structural changes, but it reversed the trend 
toward political fragmentation, which had dominated the 
19th century and rapidly concentrated all powers in the 
hands of the Wangchuck dynasty. All political positions, 
which could potentially challenge the monarchy, were 
abolished23, but the basic administrative structure was 
retained.24 Proceeding from a consolidated monarchical 
system the third king Jigme Dorji Wangchuck launched a 
number of far-reaching reforms25 in the 1950s. With the 
society characterised by «almost total political apathy»26, 
these reforms were not demanded by the people, but they 
were overwhelmingly accepted as enlightened and 
progressive by the aristocracy. In 1958, on the eve of the 
paradigm shift, the third King had achieved consensus 
among the vast majority of the Bhutanese that the existing 
system was good27 and the King was the ultimate and 
incontestable source of authority. With both the state as 
delivery system and the society as receiving mechanism 
functioning, the third dimension of nation building was 
largely completed.   
 
The extent to which the Bhutanese state provided a 
framework for self-reinforcing social values was supported by 
the almost utter absence of outside contacts. Bhutan offers 
an example of isolation approximating the ideal type.28 Since 
Tibetan intrusions failed to gain control in Bhutan after the 
establishment of the dzong system, the contact with Tibet in 
the north was confined to trade relations. In the south, 
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interaction with British India was very limited. Neither 
economic nor strategic considerations made Bhutan’s 
occupation a compelling necessity29, and interaction was 
hampered by the fact that the British Indian Government 
faced difficulties in establishing communication with the 
legitimate authority30 of a country in almost perpetual civil 
strive during the 19th century. In the whole 19th century 
only three British missions were sent to Bhutan. Moreover, 
Bhutan never agreed to the establishment of a British 
representation in the country. Thus the country’s persistent 
isolation in the twentieth century was the result of a 
deliberate foreign policy strategy rather than a mere function 
of formidable physical barriers. In spite of a Treaty in 1910 
between the newly established monarchy and British India, 
in which the former agreed to accept guidance in foreign 
policy matters in exchange for the latter’s recognition of 
Bhutanese independence, the intensity of interaction 
between the unequal neighbours remained low. After Indian 
independence the 1910 Treaty was renewed with minor 
adjustments between India and Bhutan in 1949, but Bhutan 
further resisted Indian offers to deepen relations.31 It 
required a geopolitical earthquake and Nehru’s visit before 
Bhutan decided to terminate its isolationism.  
   
The aggregate impact of undistorted nation building, of low 
intensity of interdependence with alien cultures and of the 
absence of a dominant alien power on the Bhutanese cannot 
be sufficiently emphasised. It resulted in an incomparably 
stronger sense of identity than in western societies, which in 
turn was the key determinant for the assertiveness of policy-
makers on the one hand and the ability of the common 
population to cope with rapid change on the other. In 
contrast to peoples exposed to colonial domination, who 
were gradually alienated from their own culture and adopted 
an "inferior, watered-down, partial version of the majority 
culture"32 the Bhutanese proceeded from a well-defined set 
of values, which provided them with pride and self-
confidence during the process of change and enabled them 
to establish clear policy priorities bearing the stamp of 
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Bhutanese perceptions. In fact, self-confidence and 
assertiveness are predominant characteristics of the 
interaction between Bhutanese policy-makers and their 
foreign counterparts. Bhutanese are firmly in the driver’s 
seat of development, while foreign experts are strictly 
considered advisors with no influence on decision-making. 
Similarly, it is not uncommon that development aid is 
rejected because of attached «strings» set by donor agencies.  
 
This strong sense of identity also served as the primary 
reason for the survival of “Gross National Happiness” to 
date. Despite the onslaught of mainstream development 
concepts delivered and advocated by scores of foreign 
professionals, experts and pundits, development in Bhutan 
is still distinctly Bhutanese.   
 
5.3 Buddhism and Bhutan’s Traditional Socio-economic 
System 
 
While undistorted nation-building and independence formed 
the «enabling environment» of the development of a distinct 
concept, the substance of the concept was determined by 
the traditional cultural and socio-economic system. Despite 
considerable disparities in Bhutan’s ‘fascinatingly complex 
and eclectic’33 society, there can be no doubt that the 
common denominator of traditional Bhutanese society was 
the Buddhist34 ethic and moral cosmology. In fact, most 
constituent elements of the approach are derived from this 
background.  
 
- Well-being as Objective 
 
Since Buddhist philosophy lacks a period such as European 
Enlightenment, resulting in the schism of science and 
religion, economic thinking and all other indigenous sciences 
are an integral part of Buddhism. As such, the overarching 
goal of every aspect of life, including economics, is not seen 
in the multiplication of material wants, which can be 
satisfied by consumption, but in the purification of the 
 37
human character.35 The objectives of market economics, i.e. 
increasing consumption and accelerating growth are thus 
only relevant as means to an entirely different end – human 
well-being. Buddhism turns the formula of western economic 
thinking which views all pre- and non-capitalist values as 
instrumental to either enabling or impeding economic 
growth, on its head.36 Besides, Buddhist moral philosophy 
provides a definition of happiness, suggesting that well being 
be drawn from the harmonisation of spiritual and material 
aspects of life.37 
 
Hence Buddhism as the single most important determinant 
for the Bhutanese value base furnished the core concept for 
“Gross National Happiness”, the perception of human well 
being as the fundamental objective of economic activity. This 
also turns the criticism of western economists, who smile 
about the economic inefficiency of «Gross National 
Happiness», highly irrational. They miss the point – the aim 
is not economic efficiency, but a maximization of happiness.  
 
The human orientation of development largely explains 
Bhutan’s commitment to the rapid enhancement of the 
population’s health and education with the availability of 
financial assistance after 1959. It was Bhutan’s perception 
that development ought to be people-centred, which resulted 
in decisions to invest scarce resources in social facilities 
rather than in industrialisation or the diversification of the 
economy to generate growth. Broadening its understanding 
of development by fostering modern social services, Bhutan 
essentially anticipated the approach of human development, 
which was propagated three decades later as a revolution in 
development thinking.38 
 
- Environmental Preservation 
 
Buddhist philosophy provides various strong arguments for 
the adoption of an environmentally sensitive development 
strategy. First, the relationship between human beings and 
the environment is seen in a fundamentally different way 
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than the western approach. While the latter is based on the 
Christian instrumental view «that nature exists solely for the 
benefit of mankind»,39 the Buddhist concept of sunyata 
holds that no subject or object has an independent 
existence; rather it dissolves into a web of relationships40 
with all dimensions of its environment. These relationships 
are non-hierarchical, since Buddhist moral philosophy does 
not differentiate between species i.e. humans and non-
humans. Secondly, Buddhism perceives reality as circular 
(rather than linear such as the western worldview) with 
human lives regarded as a stage in an eternal cycle of 
reincarnation. This naturally alters the relationship to the 
environment, since sustainable development is in 
everybody’s self-interest instead of in the interest of future 
generations.  
 
Bhutan’s indigenous conservation ethic provided a major 
input for “Gross National Happiness” and was perhaps the 
most consistently applied aspect of the concept. Here only 
some examples can be given. As early as 1961 the National 
Assembly resolved that trees in the ground should be 
exempted from taxation to discourage felling “in keeping with 
the Government’s conservation policy.”41 The same rationale 
led to legislation such as the Forest Act of 1969 (and the 
Land Act of 1979), which contains the peculiar provision 
that the government owns all trees, including those growing 
on private land.42 In 1974 preservation policy was 
underscored by declaring vast sanctuaries, parks and forest 
reserves as protected areas. Today, protected areas 
constitute about 26 per cent of Bhutan’s territory. 
Elsewhere, Bhutan never exploited its natural resources on 
grounds of commercial profitability.43 
 
- Self-reliance and Paternalism  
 
Bhutan’s traditional socio-economic system was based on 
the principle of communal self-reliance. The population lived 
in scattered villages, hamlets and isolated farms while urban 
settlements were non-existent. This corresponds to Buddhist 
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doctrine, which points to the benevolent nature of small-
scale communities. Topographic constraints and the entire 
lack of infrastructure limited the interaction between the 
communities settled in the river valleys of the Inner 
Himalayas with those in the southern foothills and the 
outside world. In the absence of marketable surpluses trans-
Himalayan and Indo-Bhutanese trade was reduced to a few 
necessities exchanged by barter. However, among the valley 
communities there was vigorous exchange of goods 
«facilitated by the migration of livestock and people from 
temperate settlements in summer to subtropical settlements 
in winter».44 As a result groups of neighbouring communities 
formed self-sufficient units for most purposes. Due to the 
lack of foreign influences and the extremely stable social 
environment, indigenous institutions and systems of 
knowledge could evolve. Particularly in the field of local 
conflict resolution and the allocation of collective resources 
(e.g. rules about irrigation, use of community grazing land45 
etc.) effective customary rules have developed over the 
centuries.  
 
With the exception of the collection of tax resources for the 
maintenance of the religious establishment, the officials and 
aristocracy and occasionally the militia, these socio-
economic institutions and interactions on grassroots-level 
faced very limited systematic intervention from the state. The 
society at its base, used to an economy of scarcity and to a 
paternalistic political system without any grassroots 
participation, had very few demands beyond their 
subsistence needs. With interaction between the state and 
the society at a low level, the system was rather 
characterised by feudal paternalism (e.g. between landlord 
and tenant farmer) than state paternalism.  
 
As a concept deeply rooted in the country’s traditional 
system, self-reliance did not have to be implanted by 
outsiders after 1959. Although on an empirical level Bhutan 
fell short of almost every aspect of economic self-reliance in 
the first decades of modernisation (lacking both financial 
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resources and manpower requirement), the goal to achieve 
(or regain) self-reliance has been intimately intertwined with 
the Bhutanese vision of development. In fact, self-reliance 
was the first explicitly emphasised development objective. 
The National Assembly stated in 1959 that “to maintain the 
sovereignty of the kingdom through economic self-reliance” 
was among its primary tasks. Since then, many policies bear 
the stamp of the centrality of self-reliance, i.e. the gradual 
shift to decentralisation of development decision-making, the 
reluctance to give up food self-sufficiency in favour of cash-
crop agriculture until recently, the macroeconomic prudence 
to avoid dependency on external loans, etc. 46   
 
5.4 Preliminary Conclusions 
 
"Gross National Happiness" evolved organically from the 
unique historical, cultural and socio-economic framework of 
the pre-1959 period. First, it was argued that the adoption of 
planned development was not the result of an ideological 
paradigm shift, and therefore the concept of cultural 
preservation was the mere prolongation of the dominating 
paradigm of the traditional system. Second, it was 
demonstrated that the concept‘s survival to date was due 
to the deeply imprinted sense of identity, which equipped the 
Bhutanese to define development priorities according to their 
cultural perceptions. Finally, it was suggested that additional 
substantive elements of Gross National Happiness, i.e. the 
general objective of well-being and the goal of 
environmental conservation, was drawn from Buddhist 
normative values, while the principles of self-reliance and 
paternalism were the constituent structural features of the 
traditional society. We are facing a genuinely non-western 
development approach, which considers non-economic goals 
more important than economic ones. With mainstream 
development and economic zeitgeist creating an ever-
accelerating momentum toward interdependence and 
globalisation, is it doomed to vanish? 
 
PART II 
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6. The Crossroads 
 
Viewed from the western perspective of development as an 
unalloyed good, i.e. the progress toward higher per capita 
income and other selected quantifiable indicators, the 
achievements of Bhutanese development are indisputable. 
They are even more impressive, if development is seen as a 
"two-edged sword, simultaneously creating and destroying 
values"47, a perception, which corresponds better to 
Bhutan's multidimensional approach. Whereas mainstream 
economic development was frequently taking place at the 
expense of "externalities" such as social coherence, cultural 
diversity and environmental integrity, Gross National 
Happiness limited the social, cultural, ecological and human 
costs. 
 
However, as Bhutan departs from its former socio-economic 
structures, the Bhutanese development concept is bound to 
be challenged by an increasing number of conceptual 
inconsistencies and inadequacies in the near future. For the 
sake of clarity, the following imminent challenges are 
discussed in three distinct sections: 
 
- The pressure on the redefinition of " cultural 
preservation" (6.1.) 
- The challenge to the concept by imminent socio-
economic problems (6.2.) 
- The supersession of Gross National Happiness by 
mainstream concepts (6.3.)  
 
This should, however, not contradict the fact that the 
conceptual challenges are closely interrelated, threatening to 
unsettle what is at the core of Gross National Happiness: the 
equilibrium of economic and non-economic goals of 
development.  
 
6.1 The Pressure on Cultural Preservation 
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Traditionally, cultural preservation in the Bhutanese context 
meant the containment of negative outside influences. It 
mainly consisted in the renunciation of policies towards 
more rapid economic development, as has been most 
famously exemplified by Bhutan's restrictive tourism 
strategy. However, in the latter half of the 1980s cultural 
preservation was reinterpreted as a positive policy concept 
serving as an essential means to safeguard national security. 
This resulted in regulative interventions, which interpreted 
"culture" in a narrow and static way. Measures such as the 
formal adoption of the dress code (to wear gho and kira at 
certain occasions) and the code of conduct (Driglam Namzha) 
were a reaction to the perceived erosion of cultural values. 
Yet, it addressed only the most mundane, visible layer of 
Bhutanese culture rather than capturing a more complex 
dimension. As any regulation with a sanction it tackled 
symptoms, but failed to cure root causes.  
 
For sustainable results strategies to promote culture will have 
to be adopted, utilising the evident delivery mechanisms of 
education and participation. For the time being, promotional 
activities only comprise narrow segments. As was pointed 
out earlier, education has been a priority issue of the first 
four decades of Bhutanese development. However, the 
government was more concerned with the rapid expansion of 
the educational system than with the cultural impact of 
Indian (western) curricula.48 In spite of attempts to adjust 
the programs to the needs of the Bhutanese students (e.g. 
NAPE, the New Approach to Primary Education attempts to 
provide primary students with a useful package of skills), 
this has to date hardly comprised the teaching of “culture”. 
In a teaching environment, which is largely based on the 
scientific worldview and on western philosophy, culture has 
been confined to some mythological aspects of Bhutan’s 
history, in which Buddhism played an important role. Thus 
it seems essential to revise the curricula with a view on 
broadening the instruction of "culture", enhancing the 
emphasis on the Buddhist value base and philosophy to 
provide the educated generation with the foundation of the 
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Bhutanese Weltanschauung in a timely manner.  
 
With a Hindu population of around 25 percent, cultural 
promotion in Bhutan should also include embarking on a 
dialogue on commonalties between Buddhism and (non-
orthodox, as is commonly the case in Bhutan) Hinduism, 
instead of constantly emphasising the cultural and religious 
differences. Indeed, common ground exists49 with regard to 
values and concepts rather than on the level of rituals and 
formalisms.  
 
It is perhaps the biggest challenge of Gross National 
Happiness to give sufficient attention to the preservation of 
Bhutan's unique culture and by the same token redefine the 
concept dynamically in order to attract the young generation 
and serve nation building. 
 
6.2 Socio-economic Challenges 
 
Recently, Bhutan introduced several economic liberalisation 
policies to spur private sector development. As the public 
sector can no longer absorb the rapidly growing educated 
work force, private sector development is a compelling 
necessity to address Bhutan's primary upcoming socio-
economic challenges - unemployment and urbanisation. 
However, since a private sector (apart from agriculture, of 
course) was virtually non-existent throughout Bhutan's 
history, the concept of private sector development and its 
promoting policies are alien to Gross National Happiness. 
More importantly, they are also contradictory to several 
assumptions of the Bhutanese approach. According to 
market economy precepts a thriving private sector requires 
an entirely different "enabling environment" than the one 
prevailing in Bhutan.  
 
 First, the current role of the state contradicts a 
flourishing private sector. Rather than a paternalistic state, 
which directly interferes in all parts of development, private 
sector development calls for the retreat of the state to the 
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position of a monitoring agent backed by a transparent legal 
framework. Second, to promote private business effectively, 
the government is compelled to restructure its development 
priorities towards an increased centrality of economic 
concerns. Third, private sector development requires (and 
therefore empirically leads to) a reorientation of people’s 
attitudes towards saving, consumption, work, time, and 
profit from traditional values to the rules of the market. 
Notwithstanding the state’s capacity to correct market 
failures, these structural pressures will possibly jeopardise 
the non-economic objectives of Bhutanese development such 
as cultural and environmental preservation.  
 
Essentially, the two competing western paradigms are 
potential sources for inspirations to synthesise Gross 
National Happiness with other concepts: The American 
model of free market economics with its Asian variants and 
the European welfare state model. It appears that the 
influence of consultants, the conditionalities of development 
bank loans, the current Zeitgeist in favour of liberalism and 
the (until recently) seemingly successful adoption of the 
liberal economic paradigm by the Asian “tigers” make the 
American model a persuasive option. However, the European 
welfare state paradigm is structurally by far more compatible 
with the Bhutanese approach. With a history of viewing 
economic objectives in the larger context of social and 
environmental dimensions, the European model tends to be 
more sensitive and flexible towards non-economic goals than 
its American counterpart with its centrality of economic 
concerns.  
 
Bhutanese friends and colleagues tend to strongly believe 
that their Buddhist/Hindu background will mitigate the 
negative externalities of market forces. This may be true to 
some extent, but if one takes the example of Buddhist 
Thailand, it is hardly supported by the experience of other 
countries. To incorporate concepts such as private sector 
development Bhutan certainly cannot ignore any longer the 
structural contexts in which it operates both domestic and 
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international. But it is an illusion to believe that the 
adoption of full-scale market economic precepts will not lead 
to total societal change.50 
 
6.3 The Superimposition of Gross National Happiness 
 
Finally, the perhaps most subtle challenge is to avoid the 
erosion or degeneration of Gross National Happiness to a 
merely rhetorical level. As was argued earlier the concept has 
been a reflection of a particular cultural consciousness 
rather than an academic construct. This was the concept’s 
strength in the past, when all policy-makers were products 
of the traditional Bhutanese system with a strong 
consciousness of this identity. It may, however, rapidly 
become a weakness, once civil servants with primarily 
western education begin to loose this intuitive link to the 
indigenous set of values. As the consciousness is bound to 
come under increasing pressure, its “reflection” is doomed to 
fade as well.  
 
The problem seems even more evident on the operational 
level. To date Gross National Happiness has survived in 
spite of the lack of indigenous guidelines for policy 
implementation. However, in present-day Bhutan change is 
critically determined by the aggregate output of planned 
development and deliberate government policies. As 300 
projects are the primary vehicles through which change is 
transmitted,51 aggregate output depends on the formulation 
and implementation of bureaucrats and policy-makers. In 
the late 1990s western-educated people who evaluate the 
projects in terms of profitability and efficiency formulate 
projects.  
 
Two decades ago it was observed that “most Bhutanese, 
even the young educated elite,52 were still the products of a 
traditional social system with a well-defined set of values and 
a particularistic world-view.”53 Today this certainly applies 
only to the older generation. Since modernisation and 
urbanisation have taken place in the last three and a half 
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decades, most persons who currently occupy senior 
positions in the government therefore have a close 
connection to rural traditional life and to its cultural 
perceptions.54 In the case of the younger generation of this 
educated elite, however, the factor that needs to be 
emphasised most is perhaps the extent of discontinuity with 
traditional culture. A large proportion of this class has had a 
very limited experience of traditional life, as they were sent 
to school abroad or enrolled in boarding schools away from 
their parents at an early age. Consequently, although there 
might still be directives from the senior government level in 
the spirit of the traditional Bhutanese Weltanschauung, the 
implementation level of government policies is completely 
westernised.55 Thus the bottleneck seems to be the 
translation of the vision of development, which is still 
strongly influenced by the distinct Bhutanese set of values, 
onto the project level. The failure occurs on the level of 
technocratic implementation, which is itself a western 
concept 
 
Therefore, a co-ordinated effort is urgently needed to reflect 
about and reassess Gross National Happiness both on a 
vision and an operational level. This should ideally take 
place on different educational levels as well as on academic 
and professional level.56 If no countermeasures are taken, 
the future is not difficult to predict. As the current mid-level 
bureaucrats move into higher ranks, also the broad policy 
guidelines will be determined by officials with an essentially 
western worldview. The vision of Gross National Happiness 
will degenerate to mere magniloquence.  
 
7. Conclusion: 
 
This endeavour to outline and systematise the configurations 
of and interrelations among the conceptual building blocks 
of the Bhutanese development approach can only serve as 
the first step of a more profound analysis of the concept. As 
such, it has a twofold purpose. 
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First, it seeks to draw attention to a highly original, truly 
non-western approach, at a time when mainstream 
development concepts increasingly divert their foci from the 
mere generation of economic growth. It was as recent as 
1990 that the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) proposed to remove the economic dimension from 
the centre to the means-level. The notion of human 
development “weaves development around people, not people 
around development”.57 Bhutan possessed a people-centred 
development concept long before that.  
 
Secondly, this essay emphasises the tremendously pressing 
need of debate and discussion among policy-makers and 
intellectuals to elaborate on the existing Bhutanese vision of 
development, taking into account the opportunities and 
constraints of the contemporary situation. Some Bhutanese 
tend to think that the concept is "engrained" in their cultural 
value base and thus cannot be challenged. However, as 
cultures are subject to change through altered 
circumstances and increased interdependence with alien 
cultural patterns so is an indigenous development approach, 
being nothing but translated cultural perceptions. 
Consequently, it is a crucial task for Bhutan’s development 
thinkers and decision-makers to make every effort to explore 
the contents, dimensions and contradictions of Gross 
National Happiness and to translate it to the operational 
level. A successful development strategy requires both: a 
vision of the performance which is needed or desired on the 
one hand and a cause and effect-analysis to effectively 
implement the concept on the other. Only if both aspects are 
met can Gross National Happiness challenge the 
sophisticated persuasion of conventional approaches in a 
meaningful way and leave its imprint on Bhutan's future 
path of development. 
 
                                                             
1 Most of the findings are based on the research for my thesis “Gross 
National Happiness – The Dimensions of Bhutan’s Unique Development 
Concept”, which I wrote for The Johns Hopkins University in 1996. 
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Sometimes, they have been supplemented by more recent insights.    
2 Rose, Leo E. Politics in Bhutan, p. 211 
3 Due to the lack of income generating activities the frequently quoted per 
capita income of $51 in 1960 is an entirely meaningless yardstick for the 
comparison with other countries. 
4 These are health facilities in remote areas, which are normally visited 
once a month by medically trained staff. Thus preventive and therapeutic 
measures can be taken on the spot rather than having to resort to far-away 
hospitals.   
5 The beginning of the 1st Five Year Plan in 1961 is usually considered to 
be the starting point of Bhutanese development. Since this essay 
discusses the vision of development rather than its technical 
implementation the turning point has to be the major foreign policy shift in 
1959, which is discussed in section 5.1. 
6 Royal Government of Bhutan, Seventh Five Year Plan, Main Plan 
Document (1991), p. 22  
7 According to Kuensel (Supplement p. 1, June 2, 1990) Gross National 
Happiness «has been reflected in the Royal Government’s priorities and is 
the foundation of the kingdom’s development planning.»  
8 This becomes clear from the studying of National Assembly resolutions. 
(Proceedings of the National Assembly, Vol. I, 1952-1977) See also 
Rose, Leo. The Politics of Bhutan, pp. 162 f. 
9 These are recorded in Kuensel, which was introduced as an official 
government bulletin in 1967 and transformed into the country’s only 
newspaper in 1986. 
10 Basu, Gautam K., Bhutan. The Political Economy of Development, p. 
106 
11 Kuensel Vol. 2, No. 9 (May 1-15, 1968) p.7 
12 On the country’s northern border the Chinese had seized the opportunity 
of a historical power vacuum after Indian decolonization and had occupied 
Tibet in 1950. 
13 Holsti, Kalevi J., Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in 
the Postwar World, p. 21 
14 Nehru needed 6 days to travel to Bhutan by jeep, on pony and on yak. 
15 Rustomji, Nari. Enchanted Frontiers, p. 231 
16 New York Times, Aug. 24, 1959 
17 National Assembly, 13th Session (Oct./Nov. 1959), Resoluton 14: 
«....national revenue would not suffice for the construction of the motor 
road from India to Bhutan. Thus in the absence of other alternatives", the 
Prime Minister Jigme Pelden Dorji was sent to "India to seek financial aid 
from the government of India, which agreed to provide the required aid, 
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both in terms of finance and personnel, under the auspices of Indo-Bhutan 
friendship. 
18 Holsti, Kalevi J., Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in 
the Postwar World, pp. 38 ff. 
19 Rustomji, Nari. Bhutan. The Dragon Kingdom in Crisis, p. 31 
20 Manor, James (ed.). Rethinking Third World Politics, pp. 15 ff. 
21 Rose, Leo. The Politics of Bhutan, pp. 24 ff. 
22 Ura, Karma. Development and Decentralization in Medieval and 
Modern Bhutan, p. 2 
23 Rose, Leo. The Politics of Bhutan, pp. 37 ff. 
24 Many features of the form of government set up by the Shabdrung have 
persisted until today. The contemporary Bhutanese system is still 
characterized by an administrative dichotomy with the Je Khenpo as the 
head of the Buddhist establishment. Equally important was the retention of 
the country’s traditional administrative patterns. Bhutan is still divided into 
districts with Dzongs as administrative headquarters. Furthermore the 
institution of the Dzong has retained its dual function as administrative and 
religious center of a district accommodating civil servants as well as 
monks. 
25 Perhaps the most important of these reforms were the establishment of 
the National Assembly in 1953 and the abolishment of serfdom in 1956. 
26 Rose, Leo. The Politics of Bhutan, p. 123 
27 This was emphasized to me in several interviews, particularly in those 
with Dasho Ugyen Tshering, Karma Ura and Tenzing Thinley. 
28 Holsti, Kalevi J., Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in 
the Postwar World, p. 23 
29 Rose, Leo. The Politics of Bhutan, p. 23 
30 White, Claude. Sikhim & Bhutan. Twenty-one Years on the North-east 
Frontier (1887-1908), p. 190 
31 Holsti, Kalevi J., Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in 
the Postwar World, p. 24 
32 Mead, Margaret. «The Right of Primitive Peoples», p. 312 
33 Rose, Leo. The Politics of Bhutan, p.40 
34 Although a considerable share of Bhutanese are Hindus today, «Gross 
National Happiness» undoubtedly evolved in the Bhutanese heartland, 
where Hinduism had hardly any influence.   
35 Schumacher, E. F. «Buddhist Economics», pp. 63 ff. 
36 Zadek, Simon. "The Practice of Buddhist Economics?", p. 442 
37 Happiness as the ultimate purpose of societal change is not a new 
concept. In Europe of the 19th century the economic-philosophical school 
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of classical utilitarianism reflected on the maximization of happiness.  The 
main idea was that a society was rightly ordered, when the greatest sum of 
happiness was achieved. Eventually however, the influence of utilitarianism 
declined particularly because of two reasons: First, while utilitarian theory 
was concerned about the level of happiness of the entire society, it was 
less interested in the distribution of happiness among individuals, which for 
most had unacceptable moral implications.  Second, there was 
considerable debate about the proper account of happiness, thus failing to 
agree on a common standard to measure progress.  
38 By UNDP in 1990 through the introduction of the “Human Development 
Report”. 
39 Bunting, Bruce and Tashi Wangchuk. Bhutan: An Environmental Ethic 
for the 21st Century, p. 3 
40 Norberg-Hodge, Helena. Ancient Futures. Learning from Ladakh, p. 73 
41 16th Session of the National Assembly (July 1961), Resolution 10 
42 Royal Government of Bhutan, The Bhutan Forest Act, 1969. Chapter III, 
10. The use of trees (fruit trees in orchards are not government-owned) is 
restricted to bona fide firewood consumption. 
43 An illustration that non-economic benefits frequently were deemed more 
important than economic profitability is provided by the Gedu-plywood 
factory case. The plywood plant was built with the financial support of a loan 
of the Kuwait fund. However, the Forest Department restricted the amount 
of wood felling to such a low level that the plant could not be sustained in a 
profitable way. Eventually the Dutch Government took over the loan 
commitment and the factory was closed. 
44  Ura, Karma. Development and Decentralization in Medieval and 
Modern Bhutan, p. 3 
45 Ura, Karma. «The Nomad’s Gamble», pp. 81 ff. 
46 The emphasis on individual self-reliance applies also to the household 
level. For a country which has traditionally lived on subsistence agriculture 
the ownership of land is vital for the self-reliance of most households. 
Hence the Land Act 1979 declares every transaction of land which reduces 
one household’s land holding to below 5 acres null and void (Royal 
Government of Bhutan. Land Act 1979, Ka 5.6) 
47 Goulet, Denis. "Development: Creator and Destroyer of Values", pp. 467 
ff. 
48 Obviously, the adoption of English as the first language in schools in 
1964, which was of immense importance from a development standpoint, 
tremendously complicated Bhutan’s endeavor to preserve its culture.  
49 At a recent workshop on the “Bhutanese legal system and terminology” 
(22-26 February 1999) the Chief Justice Lyonpo Sonam Tobgye explained 
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that seven Buddhist principles fundamentally underlie the Bhutanese 
dispute resolution (judicial) system. He also mentioned that Hindu 
principles are almost identical.         
50 Apart from this it is hard to conceive the comparative advantage of 
Bhutan vis a vis the thousandfold larger Indian market with considerably 
lower labour and capita costs. 
51 Interview Karma Ura, Ministry of Planning, July 29, 1996 
52 Until a few years ago virtually the whole educated elite was recruited by 
the Government. 
53 Rose, Leo. The Politics of Bhutan, p. 38 
54 Wikan, Unni and Fredrik Barth. Bhutan Report: Results of Fact-finding 
Mission, pp. 37 ff. 
55 Interview Karma Ura, Ministry of Planning, Thimphu,  July 29, 1996 
56 The recently published Introductory Economics, A Course Book for 
Class X, which encourages class debates on the subject (see p. 65) is a 
positive example in this regard.  
57 UNDP. Human Development Report 1992, p. 2 
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